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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
St. Georqe Thrift and Loan 
Plaintiff and Appellee 
v. 
Raymond L. Lowe, 
Defendant and Appellee 
Raymond L- Lowe, 
Thi rd-Party PIai nti ff, 
and Appel1ee. 
v. 
Gregory A- Knox, 
Thi rd-Party Defendant. 
and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Order Granting Summary Judgment for the Plaint-
entered in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County 
The Honorable James L. Shumate 
STATEMENT OF JURSIDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order Granting Summary Judgement 
for the Plaintiffs entered in the Fifth District Court, by the 
Honorable James L. Shumate, on August 11, 1992. A Notice of Ap-
peal was filed on October 26, 1992. The Court of Appeals has 
1 
Case No. 920S52CA 
Priority 15 
jurisdiction to hear this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann-, 
Section 7B-2a-3 (2) (k). 
ISSyES^PRESENIED^FOR^APPEAL 
1 „ Was it a substantial abuse of discretion bv the Trial 
Court to find that no material or genuine issue of fact remained 
as to when Gregory Knox disovered the misrepresentation or 
fraud? 
2. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in deter-
mining that Gregory Knox discovered the misrepresentation or 
fraud in 1986 and not 1991? 
DEIERMINAIIVE^AUIHORIIY 
Utah Code Ann-, Section 78-12-26 (1953) as amended, is the 
central statute relied upon by the Defendant in this case- In 
addition, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is relied upon with 
regard to the Court's granting the Motion of Summary Judgment. 
However, because this Statute and Rule are too lengthy to set out 
in full, they are included in the addendum, pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(f) and 24(a)(6). 
SIRAIidENI^OF^IHE^CASE 
This case is on appeal from the Fifth District Court's Order 
granting Summary Judgment for the Plaintiffs and against the De-
fendant, finding that the Defendant Gregory Knox's defense of 
*7 
fraud in the form of innocent misrepresentation was barred by the 
Statute of Limitations. Accordingly, the Court found that no 
genuine issue oi fact existed as to whether Gregory Knox discov-
er ed the all eged f raud i n 1986 or i n 1991. 
Raymond L. Lowe sold a parcel of real property to Defendant 
Knox in 1986 for $69,900, for $1,000 as a downpayment and a note 
for $63,900 dix& in three years. Lowe subsequently assigned the 
note to St. George Thrift and Loan. In 1939, the note was exten-
ded for two years. In 1991, the note was not paid, and the prop-
erty was taken by St. George Thrift and Loan in a foreclosure ac-
tion. It assigned its right to sue on the note to Raymond Lowe. 
Proceedings were instituted on December 31, 1992 against Knox. 
Knox's defense was fraud by misrepresentation, discovered in 
1991- Lowe filed a motion for judgment orv the pleadings, which 
motion was denied in a hearing before the Honorable Judge James 
L. Shumate. After a deposition of Knox by Lowe's attorney, Lowe 
filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held before 
the Honorable Judge James L. Shumate on July 22, 1992. The court-
ruled from the bench on behalf of the plaintiffs, awarding 
$30,721.27 in principal, interest, costs, and attorney's fees. 
Judgment was entered on August 11, 1992. The Notice of Appeal 
was filed on October 26, 1992. 
SIAIEMENI_0F__IHE_FACIS 
I^--^i§ckgrgund_of _the_Case 
3 
A- In April, 1936, Gregory Knox, appellant, and Raymond 
Lowe, appellee, entered into a contract whereby Knox purchased a 
residential property from Lowe for the advertised price of 
$69,900. (Record, p. 77). 
B. In connection therewith, Knox executed a trust deed note 
with a personal guarentee in favor of Lowe, in the amount of 
$68,900, due in 3 years. (Record, p.. 2 ) . 
C. During the negotiations for said purchase, Knox request-
ed permission to obtain an independent appraisal of the property. 
Lowe denied this request, which request and denial were witnessed 
by Knox and 2 other witnesses. (Record, p. 76). 
D. Knox was new to the area and unexperienced in resident-
ial real estate transactions. (Record, pp. 195-198). 
E. Lowe claimed special knowledge about the property during 
the negotiations regarding the imminent funding of a road which 
would make the property much more accessible to surrounding 
areas, and, the prospective unobstructive rear view because of 
government ownership of adjacent land. (Record, pp. 207; 218). 
F. Lowe sold the property with, only a $1,000 downpayment, 
and, allowed the purchase to be made with deferred tax and in-
urance payments, and, without the kind of credit qualifications 
that would be required to get a bank loan. (Record, p. 217). 
G. Within a few weeks of the purchase, Knox obtained an 
4 
opinion letter; not a -full appraisal, -for the purpose of m d u c -
ducing investors to advance cash for improvements in exchange 
•for a share o-f future appreciation. This letter had been ob-
tained to state what the value of the property would be with a 
••£3,000 to #5,000 investment to improve the property. It stated 
that the value, after improvements, would be $69,500. (Record, 
,_ ,-. —i cr ~r „ "i i .1 ••"-> i -r „ *-. /••% .-. .—, r^,.—, •. 
pU„ i. »_«_>; i H - i l / ? ii'J-iili), 
H. Knox judged an actual value of $3,000 to $5,000, or 4"! 
to 77. below the price advertised and paid to not be a material 
misrepresentation by Lowe. Considerations pertinent to this con-
clusion were the special "nothing down" type of purchase terms, 
the imminent road construction and the then current real estate 
"boom" in the community. Using the opinion letter as a base to 
project future appreciation, Knox obtained $2,500 from one inves-
tor and added a bathroom and a laundry hookup to the property. 
He was unable to obtain more investment money and other planned 
improvements were not made. (Record, pp. 214-221). 
I. In 1989, having learned that the road construction on 
the property had been delayed, and, that the rear view might 
be obstructed after all, Knox sought and obtained a two year ex-
tension from Lowe to pay the trust deed note. Having moved to 
California in 1988 and still relying on the 1986 opinion letter, 
Knox specifically raised it during these negotiations and stated 
to Lowe that he was satisfied with the 1986 purchase price, in 
5 
the context of the terms of purchase- (Record, pp. 198; 207-213; 
213-220; 234-235). 
J. In the Spring of 1991, with the property in foreclosure 
p r oceedIn g s, Knox learned from Dale Sm i t h, an ex ec u11ve at St. 
George Thrift and Loan, that an appraisal had been done on the 
property in conjunction with a transaction between the bank and 
Raymond Lowe- This appraisal, which included an analysis of sev-
eral comparable properties, (the details of which were given to 
Knox over the telephone), in the area which had sold in a time 
period close to the time of Knox's purchase from Lowe, stated 
that the property was worth in the neighborhood of -.£52,000, ac-
cording to information given Knox by Mr. Smith. (Record, pp. 7S; 
223-226). 
«• This was the first time, (Spring, 1991), that Knox had 
information that Lowe had materially misrepresented the value of 
his property at the time of the purchase. He had represented a 
value, $69,900, that was some $17,900, or 347. above its actual 
value. Upon learning this, Knox realized that the 1986 opinion 
letter that he had relied on had probably been a gratuitous er-
ror. Also, he notified both appellees, Lowe and St. George 
Thrift and Loan, that he would no longer perform or attempt to 
perform his duties.to them under the purchase agreement. 
(Record, pp. 7S-79). 
L. St. George Thrift and Loan subsequently regained pos-
session of the property through legal proceedings, and, sued for 
6 
the balance due under the trust deed note, plus fees and costs. 
Knot's defense was material misrepresentation discovered in 1991. 
Lowe was granted summary judgment on the grounds that the alleged 
fraud was discovered in 1936 upon receipt of the opinion letter 
and that Knox's defense is barred by the statute of limitations. 
(Record, pp. 2-35 75-73; 168) . 
SyMMARY_OF_THE_ARBUMENTS 
1,. Reasonable minds could differ on whether the 1936 opin-
ion letter which showed a .£3,000 to *5,000 premium on a £70,000 
purchase price, in light of the concessions made by the seller in 
other terms of purchase, should have prompted the buyer to make 
f ur t her i n qui r i es. 
2. In a summary judgment proceeding, the non-moving party 
is entitled to have his facts viewed -in the best possible light. 
ARGUMENT^ 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment mi states the 
applicable standard for measuring the time of discovery of fraud 
or misrepresentation as merely when the aggrieved party has had 
"full opportunity" to make the discovery. In fact, as will be 
shown, he must actually have all the facts in his possession, or, 
facts that would put a reasonable person on inquiry that fraud 
has been committed. From the language in the Court's "Conclu-
/ 
sions of Law", (See Record, p. 168), reproduced in part below, 
it seems that it may have adopted this erroneous view, while pay-
ing some lip service to the notion of reasonable inquiry when put 
on alert: 
After having obtained possession of the sub-
ject real property and the letter of opinion 
from C.G. Miller, Third Party Defendant had 
fyLi-.9EB2Ctuni.ty (emphasis added) to discov-
er any alleged fraud or mistake and neverthe-
less failed to make further inquiry regarding 
the fair market value of the subject real pro-
perty QQtw^thstand^^ 
yeyidL!2§^§_di2tated_^ (emphasi s 
added)-
The key issue here, (especially in a summary judgment ac-
tion), is why "reason would have dictated such action." The 
Court fails to explain further. Knox, the defendant, looked upon 
the 1936 opinion letter as a reason not to make further inquiry. 
Many facts in the record back up his reasoning. (See Record, pp. 
73-79; 214-221; 234-235). If other reasonable minds, such as 
those belonging to triers of fact, cgul^d agree that he was not 
under a legal duty to inquire further upon receiving the opinion 
letter, then, he could win his point that the actual discovery of 
the fraud took place in 1986. Thus, he should be granted a trial 
on that issue. 
II. REASONABLE MINDS COULD DISAGREE AS TO THE TIME OF THE DIS-
COVERY OF THE FRAUD. 
A. THE RULE OF LAW AS TO WHEN DISCOVERY OF FRAUD OCCURS. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-26-26 (1953) as amended, (see 
8 
Addendum) states in its relevant sections 
Within three years: - - -
(3) an action for relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake; except that the cause 
of action in such case does not accrue un-
til the discovery by the aggrieved party 
oi the facts constituting the fraud or mis-
t a k e „ . „ 
Case law states that the discovery is deemed to have occ^rriad .in 
two situations, even where the aggrieved party claims otherwises 
(1) When he has in his possession all of the facts 
which would have alerted him to the -frauds or 
(2) When he discovers facts that would have put a 
reasonable person on notice to investigate further. These situa-
tions ar& described authoritatively in the following: 
a. The time of the discovery of the existence of 
fraud is a question o-f fact, and the possession of all informa-
tion necessary to discover fraud satisfies the requirements of 
the Utah statute. See Hgrn^v^Daniel.
 A 315 F-2d 471 (10th Cir. 
1962). 
b. One informed of such facts as will put a person 
ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry has received such 
information as will start the running of limitations. (See 
iibsen^v^^Jensen^^lSS P. 426, (Utah 1916). 
B. KNOX DID NOT DISCOVER THE MISREPRESENTATION IN 1986. 
Knox claims that he had in his possession neither facts con-
stituting the misrepresentation or facts that put him on notice 
to make further inquiry, until 1991. (See Record, pp. 78-79; 
223-226). The controversy revolves around the 1986 opinion let-
9 
ter which Knox received. (See Addendum 1). He obtained the let-
ter because the seller had not consented to an appraisal before 
Knox took possession of the property- (See Record, pn 76). The 
purpose of the appraisal, according to the record, was in fur-
therence of a pre-existing plan to induce investors to contri-
bute funds for improvements in return for participation in fut-
ure appreciation. The opinion letter was not a full-blown ap-
praisal. It was to be based upon a hypothetical situation in 
which certain improvements were made. Then, Knox could approach 
the investors with a plan in which their contributions would be 
applied to improvements and they would share in appreciation from 
the post-improvement value stated in the opinion letter. (See 
Record, pp. 253; 214-222). 
While the opinion letter, stating a $69,500 post-improvement 
value inherently demonstrated that Knox had "paid" a-price that 
was $3,000 to £5,000 above market value, it did not constitute 
evidence of material or actionable misrepresentation. Especially 
in light of the terms; i.e., $1,000 downpayment, and, anticipa-
tion of the construction of a major road which would convert the 
area from one of isolation to the center of new development. 
(See Record, pp. 212-221). 
Nothing in the transaction or the opinion letter alerted 
Knox, in his own mind, to even the remote possibility that the 
fair market value of the property was actually in the neighbor-
hood of £52,000. Nowhere in the record does the Plaintiff, Lowe, 
10 
deny that the actual value was $52,000. Knox had just moved into 
the area from Southern California, where prices are much, much 
higher, and, relied reasonably on both Mr. Lowe, (to operate in 
good faith and/or with some expertise), and Mr. Miller, who wrote 
the opinion letter, who was a realtor and appraiser. (See 
Record, pp. 195-198; 7S-79; 223-226). 
While a full-blown appraisal, with comparable properties and 
much more information, either by Miller or another appraiser, may 
have disclosed what turned out to be errors in the Miller opin-
ion, (which in turn may have either alerted Knox to facts amount-
ing to a material misrepresentation or put him on inquiry to in-
vestigate further), nothing in the Miller appraisal itself did 
either. This is especially true in light of the circumstances 
in which it was obtained and applied, according1 to Knox's view 
of the facts as they appear in the record. 
According to the facts in the record, Knox used the opin-
ion letter not as a basis for an action against Lowe for misrep-
resentation, or as cause to obtain more detailed information 
about the property. Instead, he used it to in fact obtain in-
vestment funds and improve the property. In his own mind, be-
cause of the impending road improvement, (which fact was not ac-
counted for in the opinion letter), he thought that the property 
was actually worth the full price paid for it. (See Record, pp. 
214-221; 234-235). 
Knox's situation is not unlike that of the plaintiff in the 
11 
case of Hgiiand^y^^rigretgn, wherein the Court put aside the jur-
y's verdict and ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff had 
"discovered" the defendant's fraud more than three years before 
the action was brought- In that case, an attorney acting as a 
fiduciary, selling mining claims of a client to third parties 
failed to disclose the final high prices being paid for them. 
By such double-dealing, he made considerable "hidden" profits 
for hi rnsel f . 
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff knew or should have 
known the full nature of the transactions at the time they took 
place, (even though he did not disclose that information). Fur-
ther, some time later, but still more than three years before 
the action, the plaintiff learned from a 3rd person that unusu-
ally high prices had been paid mining claims such as those sold 
by the plaintiff. He wrote a letter, to which he received no re-
ply, and, had further conversations with the 3rd party, and made 
no further investigations. 
In reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court-
stated : 
. . . the jury chose to believe the plaint-
iff s'evidence which was to the effect that 
they did not know the facts at the time of 
the transaction and that the first knowledge 
they had of. the true facts was in October, 
1951. 
We see no basis in the record to justify a 
ruling by the trial court as a matter of law 
that the plaintiffs had knowledge of fraud 
more than three years before the action com-
menced . 
12 
Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 939 (Utah 1960). 
See also 54^_C^J^S^A_L^m^tatigns_gf._Ab£XQQ§A._§ZJ.fri, 1987, 3rgwn_ 
¥i-!5§£2-.bi££!!2£Qck_M^ 373 A.2d 1138, (New Hamphire 
1977), and Hobbs_yJL_Eichl,er, 210 Cal.Rptr. 387 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 
1985). Knot's situation is much like the plaintiff's in the case 
discussed above. He was unaware o-f the true nature of comparable 
transactions taking place at the time he made his bargain; he 
relied on a -fiduciary who gave misleading information, and, he 
received information after the transaction which may have promp-
ted some persons to make a more dilegent inquiry than he did. 
However, the jury chose not to hold him to that higher possible 
standard. 
When Knox -finally made the discovery, in 1991, o-f the true 
market value o-f the property he had purchased, he took immediate 
action and brought legal action in the form of an equitable de-
fense within the statutory time limit. (See Record, pp. 75-79). 
A jury should be allowed to make the decision as to whether 
Knox's actions in 1986 upon receiving the opinion letter were 
reasonable or not. 
C. A DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT STILL EXISTS. THEREFORE, SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT IS IMPROPER. 
A succinct review of arguments and supporting authority 
explaining why a 1986 discovery of fraud should not have been de-
termined as a d«atter_of_l.aw in this case will now be presented; 
13 
1. Knox claims that he did not discover the fraud or 
misrepresentation in 1936 when he received the opinion letter. 
This is a material issue of fact which is in dispute. 
2. Knox claims that the 1986 opinion letter neither 
placed facts amounting to fraud, (material misrepresentation.) in 
his possession, nor alerted him to the reasonable likelihood of 
fraud. In fact, the opinion letter confirmed to appellant that 
there had been no material misrepresentation or fraud. 
3- Reasonable minds could agree with Knox that the 1986 
opinion letter did not place facts amounting to fraud in his pos-
session or excite a reasonable mind to further inquiry. 
4. With a material fact still in dispute, (the time of 
the discovery of the fraud), summary judgment was improper. 
Authority for the above issues follows below, in the 
same numbered orders 
i- A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis 
af facts in the r&cord^ reasonable minds could differ on whether 
defendant's conduct meassures up to the required standard. See 
Jacksgn_v^_Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). It is only when the 
facts are undisputed and where but one reasonable conclusion can 
be drawn therefrom that such issues become questions of law. See 
E^^ccegtance^Cg^v^Lea^ 5 9 4 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 
1979). 
14 
2- The time of the discovery or the existence o-,: 
fraud is a guest i.on^of _£ act, and the possession 
of all information necessary to discover fraud 
satisfies the requirements of the Utah statute, 
(emphasis added). 
Horn^Vi^Daniel, 315 F.2d 471, p. 474 (10th Cir. 1962). 
One informed of such facts as will put a person of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry has received such 
i nf ormat .1. on as wi .11 start the runninq of 1 i mi tat i ons- See 
Glkscn^v^Jensen, 153 P. 426 (Utah 1916). 
3. „ . . the jury chose to believe the plaintiffs 
evidence which was to the effect that they did 
not know the facts at the time of the transact-
ion and that the first knowledge they had of 
the true facts was in October, 1951. 
We see no basis in the record to justify a rul-
ing by the trial court as a matter_gf._l.aw that 
the plaintiffs had knowledge of fraud more than 
three years before the action commenced. (Em-
phasi s added). 
Hgll_and_y._h1gretgn, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P. 2d 989, pp. 994-995 
4. ...Although the parties are not in complete 
conflict as to certain facts, the understanding, 
intention, and consequences of those facts 
were vigorously disputed. These matters can 
only be resolved by a trial. 
Sandberg_viIL-_Kliei.n, 576 P. 2d 1291, p. 1292 (Utah 1978). 
Because disposition of a case by summary judgment 
denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning 
questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences 
herefrom, should be resolved in favor of opposing party. See 
§§ehive_Brick_C^^ 780 P. 2d 327 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
15 
If there is &nv genuine issue as to anv material, 
fact, the motion should be denied. See Ygungiiivli<BFelornu, 244 
F.I'd 862, (Utah 1952) ; 
As the Court below failed to explain why "reason" dic-
tated f nc: to rnal-e further inquiries noon receipt of the l^ t^> op~ 
injon letter, (See Record, p. 163), and since F no , vigorously 
And reasonably disputes the claim that the letter put him on no-
tice, it should not have been decided as a matter of U w that he 
had discovered the misrepresentation in 1986. 
Ill- THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVUE. 
A^ Summary^Judgment s_ Ibe_Aggirogri§te_Standard^ 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the disposition of a 
case if the following three elements are established by a moving 
partys 
L It must be shown that no genuine issue of material 
fact e,i I sts. 
2. The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
3. This showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all 
reasonable possibilities that the losing party could win, if giv-
en a trial. 
Se&_Ihgrn_v.__CggL, 604 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979); R e e v e s ^ ^ G e i g ^ 
E'ti5!l!I,g£^ S=Stl£Slj.-lDCi.j. 764 P. 2d 636 (Utah Ct. App- 1988), QQ2Q.&C 
16 
St££e_Leas^ng_Cg^_v^_B^ 90 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 23 (1988); Briggs_vi.JHgLcgmb , 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); IheQS-V^^SeaguII^EntergriseSi^lQCi, 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 
1979); Geneva^Pige^Cg^^yi^S&H^InSi^Cgi, 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1938); 
iQ^d§C^vJL_Berkl,ey, 693 P. 2d 64 (Utah 1984); Bower_y^_Ri verton^ 
Ci.ty, 656 P. 2d 434 (Utah 1982); FredericLd§^^LQQi.yL„DuQn , 13 
Utah 2d 40, 368 P. 2d 266 (1962); Judki.ns_v^_Tggre, 27 Utah 2d-
17, 492 P.2d 980 (1972); Builgck^v^JDesertJDgdge^ 
iQEi., 11 Utah 221, 354 P. 2d 559.(1960); Singietgn_v^_Al.e>iander , 
19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967); Sandberg_Vi._Kl.ei_Q, 576 P.2d 
1291 (Utah 1978). 
B_ i:<i_§Q£§_i§__i§y^ 
Loser.-. 
A court considering a motion for summary judgment is con-
strained in a number of ways. In particular, "all evidence, 
admissions and inferences" must be "viewed in the light most fav-
orable to the loser. " Bu^]i_gck_v^_Desert_Dgd Utah 
201, 354 P.2d 559, "the party against whom the judgment has been 
granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the 
inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most 
favorable to him." Mgrris^v^^Farnswbrth 123 Utah 289, 259 
P.2d 297 (1953); See^Geneya^Pige^Cg^^v^^S^H^Ins^^Cg^, 714 P.2d 
648 (Utah 1986); R§§yes_f jL^Geigv^Pharmaceut^cai^^Inc, 764 P. 2d 
636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Cggger_State_Leas^ 
Eli§Q£§:_EyHQi_QQjLi 9 0 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1988); Briggs_yi-pHgl.-
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comb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Ihens.v^Seagul^ _Enter ^ _ 
lQ£-.i 5 ^ 5 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979), or "submission in support of or 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment should be locked at 
in the light favorable to the non-moving party's position." Dur-
h5!B_v._Marqetts, 571 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977); i§Lt^U§h§_QLtv _Cgr-.. 
v ^ ^I§!B§§ J5Q§tr ^ t or s ^ ^ I nc ^  , 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In addition, the remedy of summary judgment should be in-
voked very reluctantly, since it denies the non-winning party the 
chance to prove its case to the finder of fact. "Because a sum-
mary judgment prevents litigants from fully presenting their case 
to the court, courts are and should be reluctant to invoke this 
remedy." Brandt_y^_Ser ijngy^ 10 Utah 20 350, 353 
P.2d 460 (1960). 
In addition: 
Because disposition of a case on summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on 
the merits, the appellate court must review 
the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the losing parties, and affirms only where 
it appears there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material issues of fact, or where, 
even according to the facts as contended by 
the losing party, the moving party is entit-
led to judgment as a matter of law. 
§§e_B§ev§§«^i-§®iay-E!b§!l![D§E!§yti£§Ij._lQ£jL^ 7&4 p. 2d 636 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) ; Cgeeer_State_Leasing 
Furn^Cg^, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1938); Br iggs^y^Hglcomb, 740 
P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1937); Iheng^y^^SeaguII^Enter^^Inc^, 595 
P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). 
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.QJL £ ~ £ y l ~ l C £ _ d § Y _ N g t : - . Q 9 Q § l d e r _ W e i g h t _ o r _ y r e d i _ b i 1 L t y _ . o f _ E v i ^ ~ 
d e n c e -
A court may not take into account the weight of evidence as 
the credibility ot evidence: 
The court cannot consider weight o-f testi-
mony or cred i b i 1 i t v o-f wi tnesses on a mot i on 
f o r s u m in a r v j u d g m ent; t h e c o u r t si m p 1 y d e t e r -
mines that there is no disputed issue o-f mat-
erial t a c t a r "i d th a t a s a m a 11 e r o -f 1 a w c< n e 
par ty shoui d prevai1» 
iingleton^v^^AIe^ander, 1? Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967). See 
also^Sandberg^Vi^King, 576 PP. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978); Sggr.._y._.Crestz 
'ed^Bytte^Silver^Miningi^lQCi., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1937); W ^ ^ ^ 
§£*CQ§!§.-QQjL_Y.jL_§Qd^  1 &27 P. 2d 56 ( 1981 ) . 
i;L-._!B.~Q9y!2£_!l!§Y._^  
t.bl§_E§9£s_Are-
A Court may not use summary judgment to ascertain what the 
facts actually are in a dispute; it may only examine the evi-
dence, affidavits, interrogatories and pleadings to determine if 
a material fact issue remains: 
Summary judgment is never used to determine what the 
facts are^ but only to ascertain whether there are 
any material issues of fact in dispute. 
HiLl__ex_rel.iJFggeI_vi^^ 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 
150 (1970)- See_accgrd_Sggr_y^_Crested_^ 
IQEJLI 7 4 ° p - 2 d 1309 (Utah 1987); W ^ J ^ B a r n e s j:g^_v^^ 
aLJSesgurcesJZg.., 627 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1981). 
F • b§§YY_iycd.§Q_t9_i§t§bIi§b.-D9_G§QyiD§~I§§y§-..9f _!33t§?£i.§I 
E§Eti. 
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The sufficiency of a controversy as to material fact mav be 
established by affidavits, answers to interrogation, depositions, 
admissions and the pleadings themselves, although allegations in 
a pleading are insufficient to rebut an affidavit based on per-
sonal knowledge- The opposing party must simply show the pre-
s er i c e of some mater i a1 f act i ssue that is c on t r over t ed bv aft i-
davi t or d i scover y: 
In order for a non-moving party to oppose sucess-
fLilly a motion for summary judgment and send the 
issue to a fact-finder,- it is not necessary for the 
party to prove its legal theory; it is only neces-
sary for the non-moving party to show "facts" con-
troverting the facts stated in the moving party's 
affi davi t-
Sait_Lake_Cit£^ , 761 P. 2d 42 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
This threshold standard has been explained in the fol 
lowing manners 
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute 
averments on the other side of a controversy 
and create issues of facts precluding summary 
judgment. 
yplbrggk^Co^^v^^Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
The threshold standard for summary judgment has been 
articulated in a number of ways. It is, however, clearly a dif-
ficult standard to attain: 
Summary judgment cannot properly be granted if 
the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint 
stand in opposition to the averments of the af-
fidavits so that there are controverted issues of 
fact, the determination of which is necessary to 
settle the rights of the parties. 
Qt!Cistensfcn_ex_rei_C^^ 14 Utah 2d 
101, 377 P.2d 1010 C 9 6 3 ) . 
"The presence of a dispute as to material facts disal-
lows the granting of summary judgment. " iiLL~§L2WQ_B§§LtVj_ J Q C „_ 
v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 233 (Utah 1977). 
"Unless ther e i s a showi ng that the d± sf avor ec.i par t I es 
cannot, produce evidence that would reasonably support, a finding 
in their favor on a material or determinate issue of fact, a sum-
mary judgment is erroneous." §CLd^§:_:£jL~§§Ekman ,, 10 Utah 2d 366, 
353 P.2d 909 (1980). 
It must appeal to a certai^nt^ (emphasis added) 
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to re-
lief under any state oi facts which could be 
proved in support of its claim before a judgment 
on the pleading may be granted. 
Securitv^Credit^Core^ v^Will^;, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P. 2d 422 
(1953)„ 
A summary judgment must be supported by evid-
ence, admissions and inferences which, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser, 
show that "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law"; such 
showing must preclude all reasonable possibil-
ities that the loser could, if given a trial, 
produce evidence which would reasonably sus-
tain a judgment in his favor. 
BuMgck_v^_Desere^ 11 Utah 201, 354 
P. 2d 559 (1960). 
Such showing (no genuine issue of material fact) 
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable 
possibilities that the losing party could win if 
gi ven a tri al. 
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Ecederick^Ma^^&^Co^^v^^Dun, 13 Utah 2d. 40, 368 P.2d 266 (19b2); 
^udkins_v^Tggne, 27 Utah 2d. 492 P.2d 9S (1972). 
Summary judgment should he granted only when it 
is clear from the undisputed facts that the op-
posing party cannot, prevail. 
QQQd^t-'ii-D^J^J^i^ 739 P. 2d 634 (Utah Ct.. App. 
1987); Bra^Lines^v^JJta^^ 739 P.2d 1115 'Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
The above quotations and referrences illustrate the 
difficult burden needed to sustain a summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court will discover that there are sufficient disputed 
material facts in the record^ which, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to Knox, proscribe the Trial Court's finding that the 
discovery of the alleged fraud by misrepresentation occurred in 
1986 as a matter of law. 
The Third-Party Defendant seeks reversal of the Order grant-
ing Summary Judgment, and a remand for a trial on the matter. 
Dated this 11th day of Pebrua 
endant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this 11th clay of Febr 
I did personally mail 2 true and correct copies of the 
•f or eg o i n q d oc umen t t o: 
,.iarv 
15 "00 Fa-t Suite 202 
S. G e o r g e ., U t a h S 4 7 7 0 
and 
Michael D. Hughes 
Thompson, Hughes & Reber 
1.48 East Tabernacle 
St, George, Utah 84770 
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C. G. Miller Appraisal Service 
333 West 400 North . St George, Utah 84770 
673-3681 . 628-5578 
Mr. Crag Knox May 1, 1986 
S t . George, Utah 
Sear Mr. Knox, 
As you have requested, C.6. Miller Appraisal Service has carefully 
examined your hone located at (20 North 201* East, Panorama Park, St. 
George, Vtah, for the purpose of determining It's fair market value. 
• fully •scum—ted report will sot he presented at this time, out is 
available upon rsajsmst. This report would include cempaxaoles, a 
site plan, dimensions, etc. 
After thorough'consideration of available information, X would estimate 
the value of your homo to he $»«.300.00 . 
Sincerely, 
tmmfXnma •. Miller 
Appraiser 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Time statute commences to run. 
—Completion of construction. 
Cited. 
EXHIBIT # 2 
Constitutionality. 
Seven-year limitation is applicable to the 
owner or tenant in possession at time of con-
struction, or to their successors; those in pos-
session and control of realty have a continuing 
duty to make repairs, and should discover any 
fault in construction within seven years; claim 
that the statute is unconstitutional is without 
merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 
1974). 
Time statute commences to run. 
—Completion of construction. 
This section provides the time when the stat-
ute of limitations commences to run as being at 
the completion of construction, and not discov-
ery of negligence. Hooper Water Imp. Dist. v. 
Reeve. 642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982). *" 
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp. (D. 
Utah 1986) 634 F. Supp. 100. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and 
Construction Contracts § 114. 
A.L.R. — What statute of limitations gov-
erns action by contractee for defective or im-
proper performance of work by private build-
ing contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914. 
A.L.R. — Time of discovery . 
ning of statute of limitations ir 
action, 49 A.L.R.4th ?"n 
Key Numbers. 
55(3). 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
Within three years: . ^^ 
(1) an action for waste, or trespass upon oKiojur^-toreal property; 
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of under-
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such 
waste or trespass. 
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, in-
cluding actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where 
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the posses-
sion of the animal by the defendant. 
(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that 
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party oi^th^facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(4) an action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other 
-*n for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where 
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EXHIBIT § 3 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
/: 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(•) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
crow-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
ttpiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
• motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
lopporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
ptrt thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
crois-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
fcvor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hpaHnpr ^The adverse party prfor to the 
jday of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
jitndered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
iisd admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
/DO genuine issue as to any material fart an^ that the moving party ia enfcitleH 
fto a judgments a matter ofjaw/ A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered onthe issue of liability alone although there is a 
Itnuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
thai is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
ihall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made, and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the_ 
—mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his responseTT)^ affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, musTset torth specific t'artA alinying tha ~ 
there is a genome* iS6ue for trial If t>e don not BO rnpondj summary judg-
menftHf appropriate, SfoglTHEie entered against him. 
/ (0 Wheft arnaavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
/ of a party Apposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
/ affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
/ application for judgment or may orders continuance to permit affidavits to be 
/ obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
/ other order as is just. 
